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CONSUMER CHOICE IN THE NORTH
CAROLINA AUTO INSURANCE MARKET'
JEFFREY O'CONNELL, STEPHEN CARROLL, MICHAEL HOROWITZ,
ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, AND BRADLEY MILIAUSKASt
I. THE PRESENT SITUATION
Traditional tort liability for personal injury from auto acci-
dents has long been criticized on the grounds that its costs are too
high and that any compensation therefrom is inefficient, unfair,
and dilatory.2 But no-fault laws 3 themselves are criticized as
1. This article is excerpted, updated, and adapted for precise application to
the state of North Carolina from three articles of more general application by the
same authors (with the addition here of Bradley Miliauskas). See Jeffrey
O'Connell et al., Consumer Choice in the Auto Insurance Market, 52 U. MD. L.
REV. 1016 (1993) [hereinafter "Maryland One"]; Jeffrey O'Connell et al., The
Costs of Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance in States Without No-Fault
Insurance, 54 U. MD. L. REV. 281 (1995) (written by the authors of Maryland One
and Daniel Kaiser) [hereinafter "Maryland Two"]; Jeffrey O'Connell et al., The
Comparative Costs of Allowing Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance in All Fifty
States, 55 U. MD. L. REV. 160 (1996) (written by the authors of Maryland One
and Paul Jamieson) [hereinafter "Maryland Three"]. For an especially helpful
description of the current situation with reference to auto insurance in North
Carolina, see ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAw 4:25
(2d ed. 1992).
t Jeffrey O'Connell; Samuel H. McCoy, II, University of Virginia; B.A.,
1951, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1954, Harvard University.
Stephen Carroll; Senior Economist, RAND; B.S., 1962, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Ph.D., 1968, Johns Hopkins University.
Michael Horowitz; Senior Fellow and Director, Judicial Studies Program,
Hudson Institute; B.A., 1960, City University of New York; J.D., 1964, Yale
University.
Allan Abrahamse; Mathematician, RAND; B.S., 1961, Ph.D., 1967,
University of Michigan.
Bradley Milianuskas; B.A., 1992, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1996,
University of Virginia.
2. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL & JAMES S. KAKALIK, NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE vii (1991); JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN
KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 114-15 (1987).
For more recent data supporting the various criticisms of traditional tort
liability, see generally INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: CLAIMING
BEHAVIOR AND ITS IMPACT ON INSURANCE COSTS (1994).
Presidential candidate Robert Dole, in the 1996 election year, made auto
insurance reform an issue in the election when he proposed the choice plan
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infringing on fundamental legal rights to be paid not only eco-
nomic but noneconomic damages (mostly for pain and suffering)
and for failing to suppress auto insurance costs.' The latter criti-
cism is countered with the argument that no-fault laws' financial
shortcomings are due to preserving too many tort claims (above
defined thresholds of either dollar losses or verbally described
severity of injury) payable in addition to no-fault claims.5
Is there a compensation scheme that can free us from the fail-
ures of tort law and at the same time mend the shortcomings of
current no-fault laws?
In 1991, the RAND Corporation, which takes a neutral posi-
tion in the debate about auto compensation plans, published a
study of them. 6 Terming insurance payable for economic loss
without regard to fault personal injury protection (PIP) insur-
ance,7 RAND studied the following issues:
(1) The effect of PIP reform on (a) the costs of compensation;
(b) transaction costs (mainly lawyers' fees and allied costs of
processing claims); (c) "the adequacy and equity" of compensation;
and finally (d) promptitude of compensation;8
(2) The effect of variations in the design of PIP reforms on
items (a)-(d) above and;9
(3) Variations in different states. 10
The RAND study came to the following conclusions:
presented herein to rein in "[ojur out-of-control legal system." Dole's Speech in
Chicago Outlining His Economic and Tax Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1996, at
A12; Peter Passell, Dole's Plan Would Create New Options on Auto Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at D1. See also On Tort Reform, He's Right, WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 1996, at A18 (editorial in favor of Dole's proposed choice plan).
Further, one of Robert Dole's last acts as a Senator was to co-sponsor the
bipartisan federal Auto Choice Reform Act of 1996, S. 1860, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996). As to model draft legislation, see infra note 47.
3. A no-fault law mandates the purchase of auto insurance payable by one's
own insurer for economic loss without reference to fault, but also precludes
accident victims from recovering noneconomic damages in tort unless they can
prove another person was at fault and that their losses exceed a threshold
defined by the no-fault law.
4. CARROLL & KAKALI, supra note 2, at vii; O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note
2, at 118.
5. O'CoNNELL & KELLY, supra note 2, at 120.
6. See generally CARROLL & KAKALIK, supra note 2.
7. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1017 n.7.
8. CARROLL & KAKALiK, supra note 2, at vii.
9. Id.
10. Id.
[Vol. 19:67
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A PIP system can produce either substantial savings com-
pared to the fault-based system or can increase costs, depending
on the plan's design and variables in different states that affect
auto insurance costs" - variables such as the size of PIP bene-
fits, the nature and extent of any barrier to tort claims for
noneconomic damages, the litigiousness of the state's populace,
etc.;
PIP plans decrease transaction costs;12
Compensation under PIP reforms aligns compensation with
economic losses (mainly expenses for medical costs and wage loss)
more closely than tort law; i3
Present PIP reforms wipe out compensation for non economic
losses - mainly for pain and suffering - but only in cases of less
serious injuries; and 4
Compensation is paid more promptly from PIP coverage. 15
In choosing between traditional tort law and PIP reforms,
policymakers must determine "whether to cut costs or preserve or
increase compensation for injured people, and what balance to
seek between compensation for economic and non economic
losses."' 6
The people of North Carolina, like all Americans, are living in
a time of rapidly rising auto insurance premiums. Bear in mind
that, in the U.S. between 1980 and 1992, insured American motor-
ists saw average auto premiums increase 150% in real dollars,17
and that half of Americans considered paying automobile insur-
ance a problem, with nearly 20% calling it a major problem.',
A good measure of an underlying cause for the rise in auto
insurance premiums is the change in recent years in the ratio of
bodily injury (BI) to property-damage (PD) claims, e.g., the BI-PD
ratio.' 9 Nationally, that ratio has risen steadily - in North Caro-
lina it rose from 25 BI claims per 100 PD claims in 1980 to 34 per
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 640 (115t ed. 1995).
18. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC ArrrrTUDE MONITOR 23 (1993).
19. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1019-20.
19961
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100 in 1993.20 These recent increases in frequency of claims for
personal injury are all the more dramatic, having occurred while
many correlative indices have decreased. For example, the rate
nationwide of actual personal injuries from auto accidents has
been sharply declining, as has the number of property damage
claims. Recent technological advances and public policy initia-
tives have decreased both the frequency and severity of automo-
bile accidents2 1 - for example (1) safer cars containing collapsible
steering wheels, padded dashboards, energy-absorbing fronts, and
air bags; (2) massive education and law enforcement campaigns
against drunk driving; (3) increasing urbanization, with resultant
lower rates of speed which diminish injury severity; and (4) use of
seat belts and child-restraint devices. According to a study by the
Insurance Research Council, a majority of the additional automo-
bile personal injury claims made in the United States during the
period 1987 to 1992 were for soft-tissue injuries (e.g., sprains and
strains to the neck and back),22 which, not coincidentally, are diffi-
cult to diagnose objectively; yet during the same period, there was
a clear decline in the number of automobile injuries that could be
objectively diagnosed (e.g., broken bones), as well as a decline in
hospital admissions and disabilities caused by automobile acci-
dents.23 As a further corroboration of the anomaly of the rise in
auto bodily injury claims during the 1980s, fatality frequency
dropped by 38%, from 3.35 per 100 million miles driven in 1980 to
2.07 in 1990.24 The numerous decreases occurring in closely
related events make the dramatic contemporaneous increase in
personal injury claim frequency all the more anomalous.
20. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN BODILY INJURY CLAIMS, App. A,
tbl. A-35 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter TRENDS].
21. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 609 (112th ed. 1992) (hereinafter 1992 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT]; Daniel Popes, The Fraud Tax: The Cost of Hidden Corruption in
America's Tax Law, LEG. BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 27, 1992, at 1 (Wash. Leg.
Found., Wash., D.C.).
22. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AuTo INJURY CLAIM BEHAVIOR AND ITS
IMPACT ON INSURANCE COSTS 21 (1994).
23. Id. at 23 (Fig. 3-9).
24. See 1992 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 21, at 610; INSURANCE
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO BODILY INJURY CLAIMS 11 (1st ed. 1990)
[hereinafter BODILY INJURY CLAIMS].
[Vol. 19:67
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It should also be noted that RAND has done a further study25
indicating the difficulty inherent in allowing tort claims for pain
and suffering damages. Because such damages are generally cal-
culated as a multiple of medical bills, there is an incentive on the
part of an injured claimant to pad those bills. 26 Thus for every
dollar incurred in medical bills, an injured party can receive two
or three (or more) times as much compensation in pain and suffer-
ing damages. Insurance padding is not only lucrative for claim-
ants, who receive several times their economic loss, but for health
care providers (including, and perhaps especially, chiropractors)
who receive additional business, as well as for lawyers who receive
their contingent fees out of the pain and suffering component.27
In this new RAND study a distinction is made between "hard"
injuries that are objectively verifiable - for example, the loss of a
limb or a fracture detected by an x-ray - as opposed to "soft" inju-
ries such as sprains and strains that are not so objectively verifia-
ble.28 Soft injuries thus present an incentive to exaggerate their
existence or severity. More than in other states, no-fault auto
insurance laws in effect in New York and Michigan have largely
taken the profit out of unnecessary medical bills in smaller cases
by virtue of their relatively high thresholds, below which claims
for pain and suffering are barred.29 RAND found that in those two
states there are seven soft injury claims for every ten hard ones.30
In California, a state - like North Carolina - without a no-fault
law and where the tort system is therefore unimpeded by any bar-
rier to tort claims, there are twenty-five soft injury claims for
every ten hard ones.3 '
The estimated costs of excess claiming nationwide have been
enormous. Padding of soft injury claims has caused medical costs
to be 59% higher than they otherwise would be, and overall excess
medical costs (for both hard injury and soft injury claims) to be
about 35-42% higher.3 2 As a result, the cost of excess health care
consumption in 1993 was $4 billion.33 Additional insurer costs
25. STEPHEN CARROLL et al., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE COSTS
OF EXCESS MEDICAL CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES (1995).
26. Id. at 5-6.
27. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 528 n.1 (1986).
28. CARROLL et al., supra note 25, at 10.
29. Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 166 n.33.
30. CARROLL et al., supra note 25, at 13.
31. Id.
32. CARROLL et al., supra note 25, at 22.
33. Id.
1996]
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due to excess claims were $9-13 billion.3 4 If premiums are
assumed to vary in proportion to costs, then excess claiming added
$13-17 billion to total premiums in 1994, or $100-130 per individ-
ual policy.3 5
But the key element - overlooked by the many who urge a
New York-type high threshold as the model for no-fault laws - is
that even in New York, claims for pain and suffering above its
high threshold are hugely expensive, contributing disproportion-
ately to auto insurance costs. As pointed out above,3 6 the BI-PD
ratio has risen in North Carolina - from 25 per 100 in 1980 to 34
per 100 by 1993. 37 This was in contrast to New York, where a
high threshold barring pain and suffering claims caused the BI-
PD ratio to remain very constant at about 11 per 100 during the
time period 1980 to 1989.38 In connection with this, however,
illustrating the ill effects of BI tort claims, even New York's
$50,000 in no-fault benefits contributed only 36% of the total pure
premiums for a category of claims including both BI tort claims
and for no-fault (PIP) benefits. In other words, the relatively few
tort claims preserved over New York's high threshold contribute
disproportionately (over 64%) to total personal injury costs
(including both PIP and BI coverages).3 9
So even New York's law is by no means an optimal model.
Whereas New York has long dealt relatively effectively with
higher costs for smaller tort claims, it has also long dealt ineffec-
tively with higher costs for larger tort claims. Arguably the only
way to deal with both is to eliminate claims for non economic dam-
ages in cases both large and small. (RAND estimates that on a
nationwide basis almost half of the bodily injury premiums are
used to pay for non economic losses in states like New York which
have high PIP benefits coupled with high thresholds.)40 Further-
more, even in New York the possibility of suing in tort above its
relatively high threshold is being exploited by increasingly exper-
ienced plaintiffs' counsel. This activity has led to a recent rise in
New York's BI-PD ratio of almost 50% from 1989 to 1993, i.e.,
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 20.
38. Id. at tbl. A-34.
39. See Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1019-20.
40. See id.
[Vol. 19:67
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from 11 to 16 per 100.4 ' Thus, simply reducing the number of tort
claims for non economic loss over a high threshold fails to net any-
thing like optimal savings.
II. THE CHOICE SYSTEM
The auto insurance reform analyzed here would replace no-
fault proposals, burdened as they would be with expensive, and
even subsidized,42 claims for non economic loss along with auto-
matic payment for economic loss. This system would give North
Carolina motorists the option of foregoing both large and small
claims for noneconomic loss, without forcing them to do so. 43
Motorists would thus be given the choice of purchasing PIP cover-
age at the financial responsibility level required by North Caro-
lina law for liability for personal injury ($25,000).4 Persons
choosing PIP coverage ("PIP insureds") could neither sue nor be
sued for pain and suffering in accidents with either those who
elect PIP or otherwise. But such PIP insureds could claim in tort
against other motorists, whether covered by PIP or otherwise, for
economic loss in excess of their PIP coverage.45 As to accidents
between PIP insureds and those electing to stay under the tort
system ("tort insureds"), tort insureds would make a claim against
their own insurer for both economic and non economic loss (under
coverage termed "tort maintenance coverage"), just as they do
today under uninsured motorist coverage.46 Claims for economic
loss in excess of one's own tort maintenance coverage would be
allowed against PIP insureds. In accidents between two tort
insureds, the current common-law system would apply without
41. TRENDS, supra note 20, tbl. A-34.
42. Maryland Two, supra note 1, at 282 & n.7.
43. Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between
Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61 (1986) (the article which
inspired this proposal for auto insurance). See also supra note 2.
44. See Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 218.
45. Note that just as one can opt to buy more liability insurance than financial
responsibility limits mandate, so one could also opt to buy more PIP coverage
than financial responsibility limits mandate.
46. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1026 & n.48. Uninsured motorist
coverage (UM) pays up to the limit specified in the policy when the insured or
others in the insured vehicle are injured by uninsured or hit-and-run motorists.
Thus the insured's own insurer pays what the injured person is eligible to
recover in tort from the other uninsured-at-fault motorist. Underinsured
motorist coverage (UIM) similarly pays the insured and other occupants of the
insured vehicle under UIM coverage when the at-fault motorist has liability
coverage but with lower limits than those carried by the insured.
1996]
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change. Motorists who are illegally uninsured would only be able
to claim for economic (not noneconomic) loss against PIP insureds
or tort insureds. The following table summarizes these aspects of
the choice plan.
Facing own insurance corn- Facing another motorist who Facing another motorist who
pany is a PIP insured is a tort insured
PIP May claim without regard to May claim in tort for eco- May claim in tort for eco-
insured fault for economic loss under nomic loss in excess of own nomic loss in excess of own
own PIP coverage PIP coverage PIP coverage
May be claimed against in May be claimed against in
tort for economic loss in tort for economic loss in
excess of other motorist's PIP excess of other motorist's tort
coverage maintenance coverage
Tort May claim in tort for eco- May claim in tort for eco- May claim in tort for eco-
insured nomic and non economic loss nomic loss in excess of own nomic and non economic loss
under own tort maintenance tort maintenance coverage
coverage
May be claimed against in May be claimed against in
tort for economic loss in tort for economic loss and
excess of other motorist's PIP non economic loss
coverage
Some further details:47 PIP coverage would be in excess of all
collateral sources 48 and payable periodically. When claims for
economic loss in excess of either PIP or tort maintenance coverage
are pursued, a reasonable attorney's fee in addition to economic
loss would be recoverable. 49 No change would be made in the law
applicable to property damage.50 If an injury was caused by a
tortfeasor's intent or by alcohol or drug abuse, there would be no
restriction on anyone's right to sue in tort.
51
47. See generally id. at 1045-53, for the terms of a model federal draft bill
implementing this choice proposal. See also Maryland Two, supra note 1, and
Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 207-13 (for the terms of model state draft bills
implementing the choice proposal).
48. But see infra note 70 and accompanying text.
49. The recovery of attorney's fees is necessary because attorney's fees
typically are paid out of damage awards for pain and suffering; thus, a regime
not paying for pain and suffering calls for an alternate source of payment. Pain
and suffering damages are "a rough measure of the plaintiff's attorney's fees."
WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 528 n.21.
50. For the rationale for excluding property damage from PIP coverage see
ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CoNNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTiM 280-81 (1965).
51. Maryland Two, supra note 1, at 283 & n.12.
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III. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF THE CHOICE PLAN
A. General Approach
We first estimate what auto insurers would have to charge
the average private passenger car insured motorist in North Caro-
lina to recover the costs incurred in compensating accident victims
under all coverages and limits under the status quo. We also esti-
mate separately the costs of those buying only mandatory cover-
ages and limits.5 2 We then develop corresponding estimates for
tort insureds who elect to retain the status quo and for PIP
insureds who switch to the new plan allowed by choice. Next, we
compare these estimates to determine how the adoption of the
plan allowing choice would affect the costs of auto insurance,
depending on whether motorists become PIP insureds or tort
insureds, and whether they buy more than mandatory coverages.
Under the status quo, North Carolina motorists can purchase
several different personal injury coverages at various limits -
Bodily Injury (BI),53 Uninsured Motorist (UM), including Under-
insured Motorist (UIM)54, and Medical Payments (MedPay). 55
Accordingly, insured motorists must bear the sum of the compen-
sation costs of any of those coverages at the limits they buy. We
estimate the compensation cost of the status quo to the average
insured motorist by taking the sum of what insurers pay out plus
the associated transactions costs, under all the above applicable
coverages and limits, divided by the total number of insured
motorists. As indicated, we also compute the average costs for
those buying only mandatory coverages. Motorists who are unin-
sured, of course, bear none of the costs of auto insurance.
Under the choice plan, motorists may remain in North Caro-
lina's current system (tort insureds), elect the new system (PIP
insureds), or be illegally uninsured.56 Tort insureds will purchase
tort maintenance coverage, in addition to BI coverage to cover tort
claims brought against them by others for both economic and
52. See Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 169 n.53.
53. Bodily Injury means tort liability coverage for personal injury, thereby
excluding property damage. See also infra note 57 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 46.
55. Medical Payments coverage is a supplemental coverage payable by one's
own insurance company for medical expenses without regard to fault, often at
low limits, e.g., $500-$1,000.
56. See Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 207-13 (for a proposal allowing
motorists to be legally uninsured at the price of losing any right to claim for non
economic loss).
1996]
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noneconomic losses of tort insureds and for economic losses in
excess of PIP policies, and may also purchase MedPay or UM. Fol-
lowing the pattern set forth in the foregoing paragraph, we esti-
mate the average tort insured's compensation costs under the plan
allowing choice as the sum of what auto insurers pay injured peo-
ple and the associated transaction costs under all coverages and
limits on behalf of tort insureds, divided by the total number of
tort insureds. Note that the average tort insured's compensation
costs include the costs insurers incur on one's behalf in providing
compensation under personal injury tort liability type coverages
- BI, UM, and tort maintenance - plus any applicable MedPay
coverage.57
Motorists who become PIP insureds under the plan allowing
choice purchase not only PIP but may also (although not required
to) purchase BI to cover liability claims brought against them by
others for economic losses in excess of either PIP or tort mainte-
nance policy limits.5 Following the pattern set forth above, we
estimate the average PIP insured's compensation costs as the sum
of the costs auto insurers incur on behalf of such motorists for PIP
and, if purchased, BI coverage, assuming PIP insureds will not
need UM or MedPay,59 divided by the number of insureds. As was
the case under the status quo, people who go uninsured under the
plan allowing choice bear none of the costs of compensating auto
accident victims.6"
57. All of these coverages, per terminology adopted by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, are subsumed under the term
"Liability," although technically speaking MedPay coverage is not liability-like
coverage. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, AVERAGE
EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS IN 1994, at page entitled "Technical Notes" (Nov.
1995). See also infra Table 2, Column 3.
58. Although no one is required to buy BI liability insurance, those with
assets to protect can be expected to do so.
59. PIP insureds are by definition covered for their medical (as well as wage)
loss, and therefore will presumably have no need for MedPay. STEPHEN J.
CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, NO-FAULT APPROACHES TO
COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS vii-ix (1991). As for
UM, PIP insured are guaranteed payments for economic loss whether or not the
other driver is insured. Id. at vii.
60. ALLAN ABRAHAMSE & STEPHEN CARROLL, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF A CHOICE AUTO PLAN ON INSURANCE COSTS (1995) (more
on RAND's methodology).
[Vol. 19:67
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B. The Results6 1
The effects of the choice plan on premiums charged particular
drivers will vary with such factors as the extent of coverage, policy
limits, the insurer, the type of car and mileage driven, as well as
their location within the state. Thus our estimates are only meant
to indicate the general nature of cost effects averaged over all driv-
ers, keeping such variables in mind. Furthermore, our results are
based on (1) only private passenger (not commercial) vehicles, 62
(2) claims experience in 1987,63 and (3) premium levels in effect in
1994.64
With those caveats in mind, the following tables present our
findings. 6
5
TABLE 1
(i) (2) (3)
Total premium savings for all Total premium savings for Total available savings ($
PIP insureds (%)* PIP insureds with low millions)**
incomes and coverages (%)*
31.3 46.5 $825
61. Note that the data in this article is largely based on auto insurance claims
data collected by the Insurance Research Council in 1987. See generally ALL-
INDUSTRY RESEARCH COUNCIL (AIRAC) [now INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL],
COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1985)
[hereinafter COMPENSATION] and 1994 premium volume. But for a further
update, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
62. Although this part of our analysis examines only private passenger auto
insurance, adoption of the choice plan would likely have an even much more
favorable impact on insurance costs for commercial vehicles because the liability
exposure for commercial vehicles (especially but not limited to large ones) is even
greater than that for private passenger vehicles. More importantly, traffic
victims in commercial vehicles are often already covered by workers'
compensation that employers of such victims will be liable under PIP only for
economic losses in excess of workers' compensation. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
63. See generally COMPENSATION, supra note 61.
64. Id.
65. The data within, and the format of, Tables 1, 2, and 3 are drawn from
more detailed versions of the same tables, coupled with tree charts, found in
Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 181-206. the reader may replicate the method
used by RAND to compute this data for North Carolina or any other state by
referring to Maryland Three.
1996]
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TABLE 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Pre- Collision and Liability Pre- Percent of PI Premium PI Premium PI Premium
mium Comprehen- mium Total column (3) savings for savings for savings if
sive Pre- that is Per- PIP insureds Tort 100% become
mium Total sonal Injury if 50% insureds if PIP insureds
(PI) Pre- become PIP 50% become
mium insureds PIP insureds
($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)
2,300 751 1,549 71.0 65.5 6.0 62.8
TABLE 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
50% Become PIP Insureds 100% Become PIP Insureds
% Savings for PIP Insureds % Savings for Tort Insureds % Savings for PIP Insureds
Mandatory Higher Mandatory Higher Mandatory Higher
Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage
46.5 28.3 4.3 2.6 44.6 27.1
* Assumes 50% become PIP insureds.
** Assumes 100% become PIP insureds.
As can be seen, savings for PIP insureds in North Carolina,
i.e., those covered by PIP combined with abolition of both large
and small pain and suffering claims by and against them, turn out
to be very substantial.
Table 1 shows changes in the costs in North Carolina of auto
insurance as a result of the choice plan. Column 1 shows the per-
centage savings in total premiums (including not only for personal
injury but property damage) for all PIP insureds, including both
those who buy only mandatory coverage and those who buy more
than mandatory coverage - which savings equal 31.3%. Column
2 shows percentage savings in total premiums for PIP insureds
who buy only mandatory coverage (almost always those with
lower incomes) - which savings equal 46.5%. As indicated above,
mandatory coverage would not include BI liability coverage, nor
UM, nor MedPay, nor collision, nor comprehensive coverages.
Both Columns 1 and 2 assume that 50% of motorists become PIP
insureds (but as indicated by comparing the figures in Table 1,
Columns 1 and 2 to those in Table 3, Columns 6 and 5 respec-
tively, savings estimates are not greatly altered based on the per-
centage of PIP insureds.) The total available dollar savings if all
motorists become PIP insureds (by definition, this assumes that
100% of motorists do so) equal $825 million, as shown by Table 1,
Column 3. Tables 2 and 3 present our findings for many other
categories, including, for example, BI premium percentage sav-
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ings for PIP insureds (65.5%, as shown in Table 2, Column 5) and
tort insureds (6.0%, as shown in Table 2, Column 6), as well as
total premium percentage savings for PIP insureds buying more
than mandatory coverage (28.3%, as shown in Table 3, Column 2),
and for tort insureds doing the same (2.6%, as shown in Table 3,
Column 4).
Even more currently, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of
the U.S. Congress, extrapolating from RAND's data, has com-
puted figures for premium savings updated for 1997, which
include savings for both commercial and non-commercial vehicles:
total available dollar savings, assuming 100% become PIP
insureds, are $1,197 billion,66 compared to RAND's estimate of
$825 million as of 1993. The estimated 1996 average premium for
individual North Carolina motorists who become PIP insureds
drops from $602 to $402 - a savings per motorist of $200.67
The savings described above for total auto insurance premi-
ums payable by PIP insureds are, of course, remarkably high -
all the more so because, as noted, they stem from savings of 65.5%
for bodily injury premiums for PIP insureds (Table 2, Column 5),
since we assume no change in premiums for losses to property.68
Furthermore, as indicated above,69 such estimates are arguably
conservative. RAND limited itself to readily available data, and
did not take account of subtracting from PIP payments all collat-
eral sources including private health insurance benefits, publicly
mandated sources such as Medicare, Medicaid, workers' compen-
sation, and all private sick leave or disability coverage for wage
loss. 70 With no or at least greatly lessened incentives to incur
medical bills and wage loss as a means of inflating claims for pain
and suffering,7 ' those who opt for PIP may often be inclined to
incur lower economic losses and/or forego making claims at all
compared to their inclinations under the tort system. RAND's
estimates, without any means in its data of precisely weighing
those likely reductions, do not include these factors in their pri-
mary findings.72 Furthermore, the savings mirror progressive
66. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, THE BENEFITS AND SAVINGS OF AUTO-CHOICE
10 (1997). This JEC report uses 1987 claims experience and 1997 premium
volume. Cf supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 165 n.22.
69. See supra note 62 and Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 175 n.72.
70. But see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
72. Maryland Two, supra note 1, at 289 & n.42.
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taxation in that they will be higher still for the less affluent. This
results from freeing PIP insureds from any obligation to buy sup-
plementary BI liability insurance - a freedom that will be
embraced by those having few or no assets to protect, i.e., low
income motorists who will buy only mandatory coverage. In addi-
tion, the poor generally drive older cars and therefore rarely buy
optional collision or comprehensive coverages.73
Thus, low income motorists who buy only mandatory coverage
under a choice plan will save the most in absolute terms. While,
as we have seen, all motorists are likely to experience significant
savings on their auto insurance premiums under PIP, the impact
of the savings will be much higher for the less affluent; the result
will be significant positive impact on the fragile financial status of
low income motorists. Currently, less affluent motorists may
spend over 31%7 1 of their annual household income on auto insur-
ance and many are forced to put off buying basic necessities in
order to pay their premium.75 A recent study of low income
insured motorists of Maricopa County, Arizona, found that 44%
were forced at some point to postpone buying food in order to pay
their auto insurance premium, 76 thus being forced to choose
between putting food on the family table or complying with the
law. In addition to consuming an exorbitant amount of their
income, the relatively prohibitive cost of auto insurance has the
potential of even more dire effects on the less affluent. North Car-
olina, like other states, has a compulsory insurance law penalizing
those who go uninsured. Financially strapped individuals reliant
on their vehicles for transportation to work may be forced to give
up their driving privileges due to their inability to afford auto
insurance.7 7 The loss of driving privileges may in turn result in
73. In this regard, RAND's estimates are again conservative, as they are
based on the premise that anyone choosing PIP coverage would also buy
supplementary BI coverage at the same BI limits they bought under the
traditional tort system. For former tort insureds who had bought liability
coverage to protect their assets, that assumption would be correct. But many
low-income motorists with few or no assets to protect previously bought BI only
to comply with their state's compulsory or financial responsibility laws and
would be unlikely to purchase supplementary BI coverage under a choice system.
See id. at 290.
74. ROBERT L. MARIL, THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY AUTO INSURANCE UPON Low
INCOME RESIDENTS OF MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA 8-9, 11 (1993).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. But see Maryland Two, supra note 1, at 291 n.49.
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the loss of employment and propel them into total impoverish-
ment and dependency on publicly funded support.
The choice plan will have a beneficial effect on the less afflu-
ent in terms of both percentage of household income and absolute
dollars saved. Of further importance to low income drivers, PIP
coverage, provides more rapid benefit payments for economic loss
than does today's adversarial tort system. Low income drivers,
lacking collateral resources to cover the costs of their accidents,
are often forced under tort law to accept low settlements because
of their need for immediate cash awards of even modest
amounts. 78 A more prompt insurance system based on simple
proof of injury would be greatly to their advantage.
Finally, as to the less affluent, the plan allowing choice can
correlate premium rates with the likely costs of payout. Under
today's third-party liability auto insurance, insurers in rating
their insureds only take account of the likelihood that their
insureds will be involved in an accident, not what their insureds
will be paid in the event of an accident. This is so because insur-
ers pay not their insureds but the unknown persons whom their
insureds might injure in a future accident. As a result, the poor
(along with the young) are charged very high premiums even
though when they are in accidents, their losses are comparatively
small, often suffering relatively little or no wage loss, for example.
Under third-party liability insurance, the less affluent, along with
those with middle incomes, pay into the insurance pool the same
as the more affluent for any given level of coverage, even though
they stand to be paid much less from the pool. 79 With first-party
insurance, the less affluent can at least get credit for the advanta-
geous side of their risk - that their losses are likely to be smaller.
Keep in mind, too, that it is the less affluent who seem least likely
to pursue a tort remedy and who generally derive the least benefit
from the tort system.80
IV. DETERRENCE
Will substitution of PIP coverage for traditional tort liability
lessen deterrence of unsafe conduct, and thereby increase costs?
We think not; substituting PIP for traditional tort liability is
78. Maryland Two, supra note 1, at 291-93.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 293 (discussing the unfairness of settlement outcomes for the
poor).
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likely to create offsetting incentives."' For example, negligent
motorists will absorb (or "internalize") less of their loss than
under traditional tort law because they recover even if they cause
accidents and are no longer liable for pain and suffering. How-
ever, those same motorists will internalize more costs because
their insurers also pay for losses when they were not at fault and
thus they, too, cannot recover for pain and suffering.
8 2
Furthermore, quite apart from the effects of insurance in mut-
ing motorists' responsibility for tortious conduct under traditional
tort liability, unsafe driving is not deterred by a single influence;
rather it is affected by a combination of criminal as well as civil
sanctions, tort sanctions, and arguably above all by one's interest
in preservation of one's own body and property. 3 Thus, under
PIP, all elements of deterrence but one remain unchanged, and
even the influence of civil sanctions are transformed but not elimi-
nated. Finally, the first-party character of the choice plan allows
insurers to calibrate rates on the basis of the crash-worthy fea-
tures of their insureds' vehicles, thereby creating a market mecha-
nism to enhance auto safety. In other words, the choice plan thus
replaces today's third-party system under which the obligation of
insurers to pay those who claim against their insureds makes it
unfeasible to fix rates on the basis of crash-worthiness.'
V. CONCLUSION
The merits of allowing motorists to opt out of payment for
pain and suffering and other noneconomic loss, in return for lower
81. Id. at 293 n.54.
82. Note, however, that the experts are sharply split on whether tort liability
for automobile injuries has more of a deterrent effect than does a no-fault system.
Compare DON DEWEES, DAVID DuFF, & MICHAEL TREBELCOCK, EXPLORING THE
DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAw 15-94 (1996) (describing the comparatively greater
deterrent effect of a no-fault system) with Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the
Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv.
377, 393-97 (1994) (describing the comparatively greater deterrent effect of a tort
system).
83. KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 50, at 373 & n.31.
84. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1041. But see Warren Brown, Air Bag
Aftermath: The Device Saves Lives, But Socks Insurance Firms as Medical Costs
Rise, WASH. PosT, Mar. 21, 1993, at H1 (indicating that while air bags save lives,
they may cause insurers higher costs in payments for surviving victims' medical
and rehabilitation expenses).
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costs and receipt of automatic PIP benefits for economic loss, 85 are
worthy of intense consideration in North Carolina.
85. J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson, Controlling Automobile Insurance
Costs, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1992) (for a study echoing points made herein,
emphasizing the necessity of combining PIP payments with the concomitant
elimination of claims for pain and suffering as a means of controlling auto
insurance costs); see also Kevin Eastman et al., The New York Verbal Threshold
for Third-Party Liability Under No-Fault Insurance, 12 J. INS. REG. 369 (1994).
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